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SHAME SANCTIONS AND EXCESSIVE CEO PAY 
 




The debate over excessive CEO compensation has roiled scholars, 
corporations, and the government for some time.  This article suggests that 
there is an alternate way of attacking the problem of excessive executive 
pay—one that sidesteps the law and instead appeals to executives' emotions. 
Shame sanctions, as they are called, offer a nonlegal route to curbing 
exorbitant CEO compensation.  This article argues that increased disclosure 
of executives' compensation agreements will trigger emotions like shame, 
guilt and embarrassment by corporations and executives.  This in turn has 
the potential to influence financial behavior and cause corporations to be 
more likely to heed the concerns of the public and shareholders vis-à-vis 
executive pay. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. INTRODUCTION........... ..............................................................000 
II. SHAME: THE STATE OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ............................. 000 
 A. Arguments for Shaming............................................... 000 
 B. Arguments Against Shaming ....................................... 000 
 C. The Internal Aspects of Shaming ................................ 000 
 D. Processual Objections................................................. 000 
 E. Shaming Overload ...................................................... 000 
III. SOCIAL NORMS AND SHAMING. ............................................... 000 
 
                                                                                                             
*BCL, D Phil (Oxford University), Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O'Connor 
College of Law, Arizona State University.  I would like to thank J. Robert Brown, Celia Taylor, 
Myles Lynk, Kenneth Abbott, Rashmi Goel, Marilyn Seymann, James Nickel, Jeffrie Murphy, 
Douglas Sylvester, Marjorie Kornhauser, George Schatzki, Dennis Karjala, Ira Ellman, Mary Sigler, 
Rina Pal, and the participants of a faculty workshop for help in refining ideas articulated in this 
article.  Errors are entirely my own. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096642
2 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 32 
 
 A. Is There a Social Norm Against Excessive CEO Pay?..000 
 B. The Cost of Enforcing Social Sanctions...................... 000 
 C. The  Role  of  Norm  Entrepreneurs  and  Change  
  Agents ......................................................................... 000 
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 000 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate over excessive chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation has roiled scholars and policymakers for several years without 
either side being any closer to bridging the divide.1  Perhaps owing to the 
growing influence of those who espouse greater regulatory oversight, and the 
disgust that highly inflated compensation agreements engender, the tide is 
finally turning through the actions of Congress2 and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).3  This article argues that a singular focus on 
regulation is mistaken, and contends that an approach based on nonlegal 
sanctions is the answer.  Agencies like the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) can resort to social sanctions with tools currently at their disposal at 
a relatively low cost to change the behavior of CEOs and corporate 
directors.4  That CEOs attempt to hide the true financial implications of their 
compensation packages for their companies,5 suggests that there are 
 
                                                                                                             
1See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive 
Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615 (2005); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensa-
tion Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 67 (1992); 
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1142 (2005). 
2See Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2(h) 
(2007).  In this proposal, shareholders would be allowed to cast non-binding votes regarding their 
approval or disapproval of executive compensation packages, which are now disclosed pursuant to 
the SEC's compensation disclosure rule.   
3Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8765, 34-55009, 17 
C.F.R. §§ 228-29 (Dec. 22, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8765.pdf. 
4One such tool is the NYSE's Corporate Governance Rules, section 13 of which provides 
that "[t]he NYSE may issue a public reprimand letter to any listed company that violates a NYSE 
listing standard."  See Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, available at http://www.nyse.com/ 
pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. 
5Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Svcs., 110th Cong. (Mar. 8, 2007) (written testimony submitted by Professor Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, William J. Friedman, and Alicia Townsend Friedman), available at http://www.house. 
gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/htbebchuk030807.pdf [hereinafter Written Testimony].  
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behavioral reasons for their conduct.  This indicates that disclosure might 
produce beneficial results.6  It is revealing that corporations have stymied 
even the SEC's attempts to ensure that investors are informed about 
executive compensation agreements.7 
The direct result of concealment is that investors make financial 
decisions without the benefit of crucial information, which fails to trigger 
emotions that might be useful to the law.8  Such emotions might motivate 
investors to react with outrage or anger and inflict social sanctions on greedy 
CEOs and corporate directors who fail to check their behavior.  Social 
sanctions can include shaming, withholding of esteem, shunning, and 
negative voting by investors and other market participants.  All of these have 
                                                                                                             
"[P]ublic companies have consistently and persistently provided compensation in forms designed to 
make the amount of compensation, and the extent to which is [sic] was decoupled from 
performance, hidden or less transparent."  Id. at 3.  See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 
Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 17 (2005) ("[T]he 
information provided about deferred compensation arrangements does not allow even the most 
careful analyst to estimate with any precision the value conferred on executives through these 
arrangements."). 
6Written Testimony, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that, the "SEC adopted rules requiring public 
companies to expand their disclosures on executive pay" in 2006).  See also Peter H. Huang, 
Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets 2, 35 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., 
Inst. for Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 03-34, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=474661 ("Mandatory disclosures generate not only information, but also such emotions as perhaps 
anxiety, embarrassment, euphoria, exuberance, feeling stupid, relief, or shame.").  Id. at 35. 
7The SEC Chairman said in a speech recently: 
[W]e've reviewed the first of this year's crop, alarm bells are ringing. Already we're 
seeing examples of over-lawyering that are leading to 30- and 40-page long 
executive compensation sections in proxy statements.  I have to report that we are 
disappointed with the lack of clarity in much of the narrative disclosure that's been 
filed with the SEC so far.  Based on the early returns, the average Compensation 
Disclosure and Analysis section isn't anywhere close to plain English.  In fact, 
according to objective third-party testing, most of it's as tough to read as a Ph.D. 
dissertation. 
Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, Closing Remarks to the Second Annual Corporate Governance 
Summit at the USC Marshall School of Business (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2007/spch032307cc.htm.  Cox also reported that "the median length for the CD&As 
was 5,472 words — over 1,000 words more than the U.S. Constitution.  And the longest was more 
than 13,500 words . . . ."  Id. at 4. 
8Behavioral economics research shows that emotions motivate people to punish 
opportunistic conduct.  These studies indicate that subjects are more likely to inflict punishment 
when they are angry.  There is also a demonstrable correlation between the degree of anger and the 
willingness to incur costs in order to punish offenders.  See Ronald Bosman, & Frans van Winden, 
Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment, 112 ECON. J. 147, 148, 153-58 (2002); 
Dominique. J.-F. de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 SCIENCE 1254, 
1254-56 (2004).  Studies involving participants interacting with other participants, all of whom have 
a certain amount of money, show that participants felt angrier the more money the other participant 
took, and were more concerned about fairness.  See Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, 
Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORG'L BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 208, 217-19 (1996). 
4 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 32 
 
the potential to influence CEOs and corporate directors in positive ways.9  
The determined efforts of corporations to keep the full amount of pay 
packages secret, suggests that concealment is aimed at preventing the 
levying of these social sanctions.  If shaming is used as punishment, 
disclosure becomes even more potent, and rational actors will ensure they 
conform to the expressed social norm to avoid being shamed.10  If a shame 
sanction has been imposed, but conformity is not possible, the offender is 
likely to try to lessen the impact by being cooperative and expressing 
remorse.11  It is also likely to yield to norm-internalization12 and acceptance 
of the sanction, resulting in offenders becoming "good types" in the future.13 
Norm-internalization in this context is not limited to the offender.  Observers 
who would have been disposed to violate the norm in the future, might 
decide that the costs imposed on violators are not worth incurring and might 
 
                                                                                                             
9Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of 
Social Punishment 17-19 (Univ. of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Inst., Discussion Paper No. 2005-075/1, 
July 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=775524 (suggesting that the willingness to punish 
has important implications for cooperative behavior).  The authors explain: 
[I]ndividuals who are willing to punish are also willing to keep on 
cooperating . . . . This guaranties that, as long as these individuals have the 
opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained.  Furthermore this kind of 
individuals [sic] might help cooperation emerge, even if it was initially rare.  In 
addition, the same type of people [sic] is necessary to support punishment in the 
presence of retaliation.  If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment 
mechanism, cooperation can unravel . . . .   
Id. at 19. 
10See Harrison Hong & Marcin Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms 
on Markets 32 (Sauder Sch. of Bus. Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=766465.  A study of "sin" stocks found that "there is a societal norm against funding operations 
that promote human vice and that some investors, particularly institutions subject to public scrutiny 
and social norms, pay a financial price for not holding these stocks."  Id. 
11Alexander Dyck et al., The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from 
Russia 5 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 154, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891206.  This study about corporate misconduct in Russia showed that: 
in roughly half of the cases, media pressure leads a regulator or a politician to 
intervene, while in the remaining half, it is the company itself that relents, realizing 
the reputational costs of continuing the battle.  In sum, this evidence suggests that 
the primary mechanism through which media coverage has an effect is by 
increasing the reputational cost of misbehavior vis-à-vis a relevant audience (in this 
case Anglo-American investors). 
Id. at 5. 
12Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998).  
Professor Cooter defines norm-internalization as "a moral commitment that attaches a psychological 
penalty to a forbidden act.  A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an 
advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences."  Id. 
13Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting 
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 150-51 (2006) (suggesting that 
mild punishments, instead of severe punishments, are more effective in inducing changes in 
behavior). 
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embrace the norm, or at least conform to it.14  There is some evidence of 
CEO compensation declining in the aftermath of shame-like sanctioning, 
suggesting that the model proposed here could be preferable to heavy-
handed regulation.15 
Aside from the harm that befalls investors in the form of lost welfare, 
hiding important information prevents shareholders from exercising vital 
oversight over boards of directors that may fall short of their fiduciary 
duties.16  If, indeed, CEOs and directors are motivated by emotions like 
shame and embarrassment, policymakers might benefit from intervention 
aimed at taking advantage of those emotions.17  Such interventions might 
obviate the need for expensive legal sanctions that must be invented if social 
sanctions can achieve similar results at a lower cost.18  Legal sanctions have 
also proven to be notoriously difficult to impose even where they already 
exist.19  By tapping into existing social sanctions, and leveraging their power 
to lower agency costs, the law can have a salutary effect without being 
heavy-handed and distortive.20  I argue that emotions like shame and guilt 
 
                                                                                                             
14Id. 
15Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1022-24 (1999). 
16Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 17.  The authors point out that: 
the current omission of retirement benefits from standard compensation datasets 
has distorted investors' picture of pay arrangements.  In particular, this omission 
has led to: 1) significant underestimations of the total amount of pay; 2) 
considerable distortions in comparisons among executive pay packages; and 3) 
substantial overestimations of the extent to which executive pay is linked to 
performance. 
Id. 
17Dyck et al., supra note 11, at 2.  "Among the many tactics hedge funds [sic] managers 
use, the most prominent one is to focus public attention on an underperforming company and shame 
the CEO to either resign or change policy . . . ."  Id.  See also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control 3 (European Corporate Governance 
Inst., Law Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881 
(explaining that hedge funds can serve as prominent shareholder activists). 
18Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: Experimental Results from 
Rural Zimbabwe 3-5 (Univ. of Oxford, Ctr. for the Study of African Economies Working Paper No. 
149, 2001), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-11text.pdf  (explaining 
that shame-based sanctions could work just as effectively as fines).  "Individuals who feel external 
shame respond to anticipated shame-based sanctions just as they respond to anticipated pecuniary 
sanctions; they choose a level of cooperation that equates the marginal expected loss in utility due to 
feeling external shame with the marginal loss in utility due to cooperating."  Id. at 4. 
19Jones, supra note 13, at 126. 
20Shyam Sunder, Social Norms versus Standards of Accounting 3-7 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin. 
Working Paper No. 05-14, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725821. 
Rule makers have little idea, ex ante, of the important consequences (e.g., the 
corporate cost of capital) of the alternatives they consider.  Representations made 
to them by various constituents tend to follow predictable arguments that serve 
their respective self-interests, and do not enlighten the rule makers about the 
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have a role to play in influencing financial behavior, and that the scholarship 
on executive compensation can draw on insights from psychology and 
behavioral economics to advance our understanding of the methods of 
influencing CEO conduct.21  This helps to advance the scholarship beyond 
the hackneyed arguments about regulation that are routinely bandied about, 
and are often based purely upon severely stunted rational choice models.22  It 
also offers a third, contrarian approach to the problem of excessive CEO 
pay.23  My thesis focuses on the role of shame and embarrassment in 
enforcing social norms against excessive CEO pay.24  Given the fact that the 
emotions engendered by mandatory disclosures are by no means uniform, the 
fact that disclosures are structured in ways that are confusing and convoluted 
raises the level of emotional dissonance in the market.25  This dissonance is 
expressed, for example, in the knee-jerk reactions visible when companies 
report that earnings must be restated, or when they do not expense stock 
options in compensation agreements, regardless of the actual financial 
implications for investors.26  Clarity with regard to the total compensation 
paid to a CEO will help norms entrepreneurs27 deploy social sanctions, such 
                                                                                                             
consequences.  Such arguments often turn out to be hollow posturing after the new 
rules are implemented. 
Id. at 6. 
21Huang, supra note 6, at 14.  "Many of the cognitive psychological insights of behavioral 
finance were already an accepted part of the folk-wisdom that formed the basis and rationale for our 
federal system of securities regulation."  Id. 
22Social sanctions like shame and ostracism might not work under the assumption of selfish 
utility maximization unless the offender values what other people think about him or her, because if 
she or he does not, she or he does not experience any loss in utility.  See Amartya K. Sen, Rational 
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 
335-56 (1977) (attacking the limitations of preferences in explaining conduct that shows that 
individuals do not always make personal welfare maximizing choices). 
23The first two approaches are: (1) more regulation, advanced by Bebchuk et al. and (2) 
laissez faire, advanced by Bainbridge et al.  See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 1; Bainbridge, supra note 
1. 
24It is well documented that social norms can play an important role in promoting 
cooperative behavior.  See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public 
Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 984-93 (2000). 
25See Cox, supra note 7, at 9.  Cox explained that: 
GE's CEO actually made about $1.7 million less in 2006 than was reported using 
the 123R number . . . . [W]e discovered all of this on a Google search.  But it took 
a little work.  Today, there's not a good free website that links to this kind of 
information for many different companies, and that lets investors do this sort of 
math automatically. 
Id. at 9. 
26Bill Saporito et al., Wall Street's Verdict: While Washington Dithers on Reform, Investors 
are Pushing the Stock Market Down, Down, Down, TIME MAG., July 29, 2002, at 18, 23-24 
(reporting on investor anxiety from uncertainty over the cost of executive stock option grants). 
27Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal 
Academy, in SOCIAL NORMS 44, 44 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001).  Professor 
Ellickson defines a "norm entrepreneur" as someone who "possess[es] a relatively high level of 
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as shame, to keep CEO compensation commensurate with performance.  
Better disclosure will also allow shareholders to determine if compensation 
is excessive, and to the extent that they think it is excessive, it will allow 
them to participate in sanctioning both the directors who approved the 
package, and the CEOs who demanded it.  It also facilitates the creation of a 
norm that requires large institutional shareholders to engage in sanctioning 
behavior.28  The creation of such a norm will minimize the free-rider 
problem by imposing costs on parties who choose not to pay the costs 
associated with enforcing the primary norm.  Large institutional investors 
that do not sanction directors who approved inflated pay packages by 
shaming or removing them from the board, might also become targets of 
shaming by smaller investors and the broader financial community. 
The enormous expense and inefficiency of attempts to regulate market 
manipulation should prompt investors and scholars to seriously examine the 
role of alternative sanctions like shaming.29  While there has been attention 
devoted to shaming in other areas of the law, most particularly in criminal 
law,30 corporate law scholars have only seemed to discuss shaming in 
passing.31  Given the financial and institutional costs imposed by legal 
sanctions, and the hostility of the market towards bearing such costs, 
shaming should be particularly attractive due to its low cost and 
decentralized enforcement potential.32  That much of the law on the fiduciary 
duties of boards of directors is morally driven should have occasioned a 
greater focus on shaming sanctions, because, at their very core, they are 
                                                                                                             
technical knowledge relevant to the norms within [their] specialty" and is "likely to be cognizant that 
there are appreciative experts . . . who are likely immediately to esteem the norm entrepreneur for 
trying to change the social practice at issue."  Id. 
28Recent activism by institutional shareholders might be evidence of such behavior.  See 
Gretchen Morgenson, Investor Discontent Fills Annual Meeting Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2006, at C1. 
29See Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and 
Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Treaty, 20 ARIZ. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 561, 566 (2003). 
30Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631 
(1996); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999); Dan Markel, Are 
Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the 
Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2167-77 (2001); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, 
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (1991); James Q. Whitman, 
What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056 (1998).  
31See Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: 
Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 261-62 
(2004).  The one notable exception is David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1811, 1812 (2001). 
32Wexler, supra note 29, at 564 (pointing out "[o]ne advantage of shaming penalties, as 
compared to incarceration, is their cheapness") (citing Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime, Evaluating 
the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2189 (2003)). 
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forms of moral disapprobation.  The shortage of analysis on shaming 
involving CEO compensation is all the more curious given the increased use 
of rhetoric that invokes shaming-like language and tactics by market 
participants, most particularly by pension funds and other institutional 
shareholders.33  Such rhetoric has also been deployed increasingly by norms 
entrepreneurs like Professor Lucian Bebchuk, and it is argued that the work 
of these scholars has a major role in the application of social sanctions. 
Shaming, as it is used in this article, refers to a deliberate attempt to 
negatively impact a CEO or director's reputation by publicizing and targeting 
wrongful conduct occurring under their control.34  This is to be distinguished 
from unintentional reputational damage that might be sustained by mere 
exposure from the news media or other agencies.35  While this definition 
seems to be accepted by many legal scholars, Professor Jeffrie Murphy does 
not characterize these kinds of sanctions as shaming.36  He distinguishes 
shame from humiliation, placing emphasis on the need for internalization in 
the former.37 
 
                                                                                                             
33Siobhan Hughes & Kaja Whitehouse, Labor Fights Verizon Board Over CEO's 
Compensation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2007, at A3 (discussing the labor union's goal of removing 
Verizon directors who approved paying Verizon CEO Ivan Seidenburgh $110 million in 
compensation over five years, when the company suffered losses).  The article quotes AFL-CIO 
Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka as saying, "I defy anybody to say this guy's [sic] earned the 
money" and calling Verizon "the poster child for pay for pulse." 
34See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=967521.  
"Although there is some disagreement about whether shaming punishments are properly named, 
most agree that shaming punishments involve the deliberate public humiliation of the offender."  Id. 
at 2. 
35Shame should also be distinguished from guilt.  According to some scholars, "[S]hame is 
related to a devaluation of the self, and therefore the action tendency of shame is withdrawal and 
avoidance of further contact.  On the other hand, guilt is more related to the blameworthiness of an 
act and is thus more likely to result in reparation and action."  See Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 
9, at 21.   Psychologist Donald L. Nathanson writes, "[G]uilt is the painful emotion triggered when 
we become aware that we have acted in a way to bring harm to another person or to violate some 
important code."  DONALD L. NATHANSON, SHAME AND PRIDE 19 (1994).  Philosopher Stephen 
Darwall writes, "One feels that one should and could have done what one didn't do, and feels 
appropriately blamed for that reason.  And whereas guilt's characteristic expression is second-
personal, shame inhibits second-personal engagement—one feels like escaping from view."  Stephen 
Darwall, Moral Obligation and Accountability 5, in  OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS (Russ 
Shafer-Landau ed., 2007), available at http://www.philosophy.ucr.edu/conference/Darwall-
Obligation.pdf.  
36Jeffrie G. Murphy, Shame Creeps Through Guilt and Feels Like Retribution, 18 LAW & 
PHIL. 327, 337-38 (1999).  "I want to stress . . . that the arguments I shall here give in defense of 
moral shame should not be seen as offering even partial support for the currently trendy movement 
in American criminal law toward what are sometimes called 'shaming punishments. '"  Id. at 337. 
37Professor Murphy's criticism is trenchant: 
As practiced in America, these punishments (e.g., requiring prisoners to work on 
chain gangs or wear pink underwear or requiring convicted sex offenders to post 
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Professor Murphy's definition requires an internal element that he 
refers to as "moral shame" to distinguish it from "shame" as the term is 
employed here.38  "Moral shame," then, refers "to a collision between one's 
actual self—past or present—and one's internalized and moral ego ideal."39  
Rather than dismissing the literature on shaming as Professor Murphy does, 
this article prefers to adopt a definition of shame that includes both facets.  
The actions of outsiders are aimed at instilling shame and can be 
characterized as the external element.  One's own feelings of shame, either in 
response to the actions of others, or because of one's own conception of 
having fallen short of an ideal, can be characterized as the internal element.  
While shaming activity is possible without the internal dimension being 
present, both elements are necessary in order for it to be successful. 
Shaming in the CEO compensation arena could be aimed at the 
following outcomes: labeling a CEO as excessively greedy, creating a 
reputation for a director as a "bad director," labeling directors as disloyal to 
shareholders' interests, excluding those disloyal directors from other 
boards,40 causing economic harm to directors who approve excessive CEO 
compensation packages, and causing CEOs to be shunned by other 
corporations and commercial entities.  The need for a society that has, at 
least, a minimum of shared beliefs and ideals is necessary if shaming is to 
have any power as a sanction.  Shame sanctions are most effective in 
situations characterized by small, largely homogenous, and tightly-bound 
communities with many shared values.41  Regardless of differences in 
religion, ethnicity, education, goals, political affiliations, race, and gender, 
all shareholders share the belief that corporate assets must not be used to 
give windfalls to CEOs at their expense.42  Large shareholders, such as 
                                                                                                             
notices of their crimes on their houses) have little or nothing to do with moral 
shame but rather strike me as mainly coercive exercises in humiliation and 
degradation—a kind of smug and mean spirited vengeance with tendencies to lapse 
into arbitrary cruelty.  They do not engage and rebuild the core of the moral self but 
simply add extra punitive burdens and inconveniences (some of them quite 
grotesque) to the criminal's post-conviction life. 
Id. at 337-38.  It is unclear if Professor Murphy believes that humiliation does not require 
the internal aspect, although there is no reason to assume that it does not. 
38Id. at 338. 
39Id. 
40See Troy Wolverton, AFL-CIO's Throw-the-Bum-Out Call Gets Cool Reception, The 
Street.com (Sept. 26, 2003), http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10116076.html 
(explaining a call by AFL-CIO for Kenneth Lagone, a director of the NYSE board who defended 
Richard Grasso's compensation package, to be dropped from the board of GE and four other public 
companies). 
41Skeel, supra  note 31, at 1811. 
42Some believe that shareholders are only motivated by the desire to make money.  See 
JOHN R. NOFSINGER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING, at xi (2002): 
An old Wall Street adage states that two factors move the market: fear and greed.  
Although true, this characterization is far too simplistic.  The human mind is very 
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institutional investors, are also likely to be part of an epistemic community.43 
 A shared value requiring CEOs to work for the benefit of the company, and 
for directors to ensure that CEOs are adequately compensated, is sufficient 
for shaming to work.  Shame can only play a role in constraining behavior if 
participants believe that bad behavior invites opprobrium, and therefore act 
in ways that are calculated to avoid shame. 
A study of corporate conduct suggests that shame plays a role in 
constraining behavior.  Evidence from empirical research will be considered 
in the following pages to understand the extent to which shame constrains 
behavior, and the ways in which it can be used to rein in CEO pay.  Apart 
from being members of corporate boards, directors are part of several 
groups, like other corporate boards, clubs, and organizations.  Interdepend-
ence and networking are indeed the very currency of the corporate 
boardroom.  This enmeshment in groups presents conditions ripe for the 
deployment of shame sanctions.  As will become apparent, for all but the 
most egregiously isolated director, shame will have some role in constraining 
conduct.  Even for the most egregious anomaly, shame is not irrelevant 
because it shows that there is a cost, however small, associated with bad 
conduct.  Even if the director or CEO is shameless, the very process of 
shaming has the effect of establishing and cementing the asserted norm—not 
a trivial function because it tells others who might become directors or CEOs 
that bad conduct invites shaming.44  Thus, as long as reputation is not 
completely irrelevant, shame matters.45  It is difficult to see how directors 
and CEOs of any company can be callous about their reputations.  Indeed, it 
is most likely that these people are from the very sections of society that are 
most concerned with their reputations.46  They have elections to win, 
                                                                                                             
sophisticated, and human emotions are very complex.  The emotions of fear and 
greed just don't adequately describe the psychology that affects people. 
Id. 
43Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).  Haas defines an epistemic community as a "network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area."  Id. at 3. 
44See Kahan, supra note 30, at 639.  Professor Kahan argues that shaming has the effect of 
shaping preferences.  If individuals are shamed for contravening a particular asserted norm, other 
observers will modify their own behavior to fit that asserted norm. 
45Professor Kahan's widely reported recantation of his earlier views on shaming expressly 
rejects the argument that shaming is inappropriate because some offenders are shameless.  Instead, 
he seems to be basing his recantation on the idea that shaming is partisan.  See Dan M. Kahan, 
What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2076 (2006) ("What's really 
wrong with shaming penalties . . . is that they are deeply partisan: when society picks them, it picks 
sides, aligning itself with those who subscribe to norms that give pride of place to community and 
social differentiation rather than to individuality and equality."). 
46See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 823 (2001) 
(hypothesizing that media coverage makes directors fear liability even more than they ought to).  The 
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business deals to make, and careers to advance—all of which are founded on 
the possession of a good reputation.  The stakes are much higher for these 
actors than they are for the average criminal, and shame, at least 
theoretically, must have a constraining effect on reputation conscious actors 
if they wish to be repeat players.47  This might explain the hand-wringing 
that goes on within the director community when egregious violations are 
highlighted.48  It has been frequently suggested that cases like In re Walt 
Disney Company Derivative Litigation49 have the effect, apart from the facts 
and judgment of the court, of making directors more afraid and more 
conscious of their responsibilities, even if that case did not result in the 
imposition of liability.50 
Although directors get paid very little and perceive the risk of liability 
to be rather high, despite protestations to the contrary, there is no dearth of 
people who strive for positions on corporate boards.  If compensation is not 
the primary motivation for board service, then considerations of prestige and 
esteem in society may be motivational factors for people coveting these 
appointments.51  Thus, sanctions like shame can be powerful constraints 
because they strike at the very root of the motivation for these individuals to 
want the good in question.  If the risk of being shamed is rather high, these 
individuals might be constrained to act in ways that maximize shareholder 
interests and are seen to do so.52  To be sure, this constraint comes into 
conflict with the urge for self-preservation, since it is the CEO who 
                                                                                                             
"hypothesis is that under certain predictable circumstances, executives will overestimate the risk of 
liability.  There are a number of possible reasons.  One is that newspapers and business periodicals 
highlight dramatic instances of such suits, and hence the threat of liability."  Id.  See also Alexander 
Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE 
ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 107, 109, 122 (2002) (expounding on the 
theory that corporate executives act appropriately because they do not want their reputations 
tarnished by negative media coverage). 
47Shaming will have a greater effect on corporate directors and CEOs because they generally 
hold their reputations in high regard as opposed to those who are not so concerned with the effects 
certain actions will have on their reputations.  See, e.g., ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 
186 (9th ed. 2004).  Aronson explains that "individuals with the highest self-esteem experience the 
most dissonance when they behave in a stupid or cruel manner."  Id. 
48Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2005) ("[Directors] do not like to be made the object of public scorn and 
ridicule."). 
49In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
50Martha Neil, Disney Case Has No Storybook Ending, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 6, 2005, 
available at Westlaw, 4 No. 35 ABAJEREP 5 (asserting that the Disney decision will spur directors 
to be more attentive).  The following words of the court have an ominous ring and might have served 
to send the message "that the Opinion may serve as guidance for future officers and directors—not 
only of The Walt Disney Company, but of other Delaware corporations."  Disney, 907 A.2d at 698. 
51Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 12.  "Besides an attractive salary, a directorship is also 
likely to provide prestige and valuable business and social connections."  Id. 
52Id.  Professors Bebchuk and Fried note that directors "might have an incentive to develop 
reputations as shareholder-serving."  
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effectively determines if a person can become a director or stay on the 
board—actions that bring the director into conflict with the CEO are 
avoidable unless there are powerful incentives for taking those actions.  
Shaming might provide such an incentive.53  Professor Bebchuk refers to 
"outrage costs" that directors have to bear when excessive compensation 
agreements are revealed.54  Although he does not expressly refer to it, 
shaming appears to be at work in this context.  When outrage is expressed, it 
is inevitable that some, if not all, directors will be shamed, either in the 
internal or external dimension.  Faced with this choice, the director is caught 
between Scylla and Charybdis: if he or she ignores the deleterious effects for 
shareholders of an excessive compensation agreement and approves it, the 
director risks being subjected to a shaming sanction.  If, on the other hand, 
the director voices objections to the agreement and votes against it, he or she 
will quickly be labeled a feisty director, and might not be welcome on other 
boards or even on the present one.  This is certainly not ideal for individual 
directors, but it is hard to imagine why it might be bad for shareholders, 
except to the extent that it creates a shortage of good directors. 
It is certainly true that the major reason people desire CEO positions 
are the financial incentives; shaming might be less effective when applied to 
these actors.  This contrast might explain the different reactions of Richard 
Grasso and the board members of the NYSE to reports about the excessive 
compensation paid to him.  Many directors who had approved the deal did a 
volte-face, while Grasso continued to maintain that he did nothing wrong.55 
This article will attempt to explore the linkages between shaming 
sanctions and excessive CEO compensation.  In Part II, I provide a brief 
sketch of the scholarly treatment of shame sanctions in other areas of law 
and their role in strengthening social norms.  In Part III, I focus on how 
shaming can be deployed in the CEO compensation arena.  In doing the 
 
                                                                                                             
53Id. at 16.  The authors explain: 
[D]irectors and executives adopting such an [egregious compensation package] 
might bear social costs.  Directors approving a clearly inflated and distorted pay 
package might be subject to ridicule or scorn in the media or in their social and 
business circles.  Most directors would wish to avoid such treatment, even if their 
board positions were not at risk, and these potential social costs reinforce the 
constraints imposed by market forces. 
Id. 
54Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 5, at 16.  "The more outrage a compensation arrangement is 
expected to generate, the larger will be the potential economic and social costs, and thus the more 
reluctant directors will be to approve it and the more hesitant managers will be to propose it in the 
first place."  Id. 
55Ben White, Pay Raised Eyebrows Early On, NYSE Disagreed Over Grasso in '98, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at E03 (addressing the NYSE directors' concern about Grasso's compensation 
package). 
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above, I seek to make a contribution in moving the state of the scholarship 
beyond passing mentions of the role of social norms and shame sanctions in 
the CEO compensation arena.  By providing a clear conceptual framework 
that identifies the relevant targets for the deployment of the shame sanction, 
the enforcers of the shame sanction, and the limitations of the sanction, I aim 
to open up new areas for the study of ways in which social sanctions can 
help curb excessive CEO compensation and promote shareholder interests. 
 
II.  SHAME: THE STATE OF THE SCHOLARSHIP 
 
A.  Arguments for Shaming 
 
Shame has attained its height, in terms of scholarly treatment, in 
criminal law.  It is described as "the process by which citizens publicly and 
self-consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an 
offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or 
engaging in those actions."56  Whether it is the publication of the names of 
patrons of prostitutes in newspapers,57 or the requirement that people 
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs display special 
license plates or bumper stickers,58 the objective is the same—to reveal bad 
dispositions.59  Shame works by harvesting the sense of moral disapproval 
 
                                                                                                             
56Kahan & Posner, supra note 30, at 368.  See also Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: 
Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2187 
(2003) (defining shame sanctions as "punishments that are directed primarily at publicizing an 
offender's illegal conduct in a way intended to reinforce the prevailing social norms that disapprove 
of such behavior and thus to induce an unpleasant emotional experience in the offender").  
57Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 735 
(1998) (discussing various shaming techniques used in criminal law); Courtney Guyton Persons, 
Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of 
Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (1996) 
(explaining that some cities have begun to expose the solicitors of prostitution through shaming 
practices). 
58Donna DiGiovanni, Comment, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation that Failed, 22 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 643, 644 (1988) (citing Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986)). 
59Some reported cases where shaming has been employed are: United States v. Gementera, 
379 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming a decision requiring a convict to wear a signboard 
proclaiming his guilt); United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 939 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming a 
decision requiring a convicted sex offender to publish notice in the official journal of the parish, in 
addition to permitting his probation officer to require notice through signs, handbills, bumper 
stickers, clothing labels, and going door-to-door); United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1119 
(7th Cir. 1994) (affirming a decision requiring the convict to notify all future employers of his prior 
criminal tax offenses); Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So.2d 123, 124-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) 
(affirming a decision requiring a defendant to place a sticker on his bumper reading: "CONVICTED 
DUI—RESTRICTED LICENSE"); Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga. App. 627, 628-29 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1993) (imposing a condition requiring the offender to wear a fluorescent pink bracelet bearing the 
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felt by the community at the actions of the offender.60  The enforcer is 
stepping into the shoes of the community as an organic entity, tapping into 
the sense of outrage and disapproval, and voicing it on behalf of the 
community.61  Frequently, the enforcer is presumptively acting on behalf of 
the community without any authorization for such action, basing the actions 
on a strange sense of self-confidence that the community is behind his or her 
actions.62  Such presumptive action sanctions conduct that is wrong and 
serves a signaling function that cautions bystanders to the serious loss of 
reputation that accompanies bad conduct.63  Commonly, sanctions chill 
otherwise good conduct depending on the actor's tolerance for risk.64  
Ultimately, shame sanctions are aimed at deterrence.65 
Before his recent recantation, the principal exponent of shame 
sanctions in criminal law was Professor Dan Kahan.66  Professor Kahan's 
views in support of shaming were tied to his belief in the expressive 
functions of criminal law—that society's expression of disapproval of 
criminal conduct is crucial if it is to be effective.67  Professor Kahan argued 
that shame had the ability to express this disapproval better than 
incarceration, and was, therefore, preferable.68  According to him, the serious 
harm to reputation serves both the deterrent and retributive objectives of 
criminal law.69  Shaming is more attractive than incarceration because it does 
not come with the costs associated with the machinery that is needed for 
incarceration.70  The task of enforcement is delegated to the community and 
the state does not have to spend money to carry out the sanction.71  Shame 
                                                                                                             
words "DUI CONVICT"). 
60Skeel, supra note 31, at 1816. 
61Id. at 1814. 
62Id.  
63Id. 1814-15. 
64Skeel, supra note 31, at 1816. 
65This is at the root of such shame sanctions as wearing signs announcing the crime in 
public, requiring criminals to wear pink clothes in prison, and placing stickers on cars for drunk 
driving.  See Note, supra note 56, at 2189-94. 
66Kahan, supra note 45, at 2075.  Professor Kahan's recantation appears to be based on his 
belief that shaming is partisan, and that incarceration is preferable to shaming because it is 
"expressively overdetermined."  Id. at 2076.  Professor Kahan explains that "[a] law or policy can be 
said to be expressively overdetermined when it bears meanings sufficiently rich in nature and large 
in number to enable diverse cultural groups to find simultaneously affirmation of their values within 
it."  Id. at 2085 (citing Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear 
of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY 
L.J. 569 (2006)). 
67Kahan, supra note 30, at 594. 
68See id. at 592.  See also Flanders, supra note 34, at 4 ("Compared to imprisonment, 
shaming punishments inflict much less physical cruelty.  Indeed, they replace damage to one's 
physical integrity with mere damage to one's status or reputation."). 
69Kahan, supra note 30, at 630-49. 
70Kahan & Posner, supra note 30, at 371. 
71Kahan, supra note 30, at 635-37. 
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might have supplementary advantages when deployed in conjunction with 
occasionally weak legal sanctions like penalties and fines, which may not be 
sufficiently effective in circumstances where the offender has vast economic 
resources.72  Reputation is perhaps the most significant attribute to such 
offenders, and therefore, when accompanied by a fine, a shame sanction can 
be an extremely effective tool. 
Shaming meshes neatly with the CEO compensation debate because it 
does something that legal sanctions do not effectively accomplish.  Legal 
sanctions are crude in their application—imprisonment and financial 
penalties do not serve to convey the emotions aroused by the actions of the 
offender.73  Frequently, for most indirect, non-dangerous offenses, all that 
civilized society wants is for these emotions be ventilated, rather than to see 
the offender go to jail or that they be made to pay a fine.  Addressing this 
concern is part of the law's expressive dimension.74   
In the CEO compensation case, one is not trying to get the CEO, who 
is excessively greedy, or the director, who does not exercise appropriate 
oversight over a compensation agreement, punished with the tools 
conventionally used to mete out legal punishment.  Society recognizes that 
their conduct is not worthy of jail time, and that fines are crude matches for 
their actions.  Legal sanctions, therefore, become inappropriate tools for 
what society really aims to accomplish.  Any sanction, if it is to be 
meaningful and reflective of a sophisticated system, must match the message 
that society is trying to convey to the offender, and be proportional to the 
offense.  Social sanctions, such as shaming, are more appropriate sanctions 
because they serve the expressive function of the law insofar as they tell the 
offender that they have acted in a way that warrants society's disapproval.  It 
leaves other consequences to individual members of society to administer. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
72Id. at 619-20.  This problem persists in most areas where fines are the punishment.  For 
example, a fine would have been a rather weak sanction when applied to Martha Stewart because of 
her vast financial resources, whereas shaming can strike at a commodity that might not be so easily 
replaceable—reputation. 
73Id. at 621. 
74See generally Flanders, supra note 34, at 4.  Flanders states: 
The law does not exist merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says things 
through its actions. . . . It is not as if society punishes by inflicting suffering and 
then stating in words that it does not approve of the offender's conduct.  Rather, the 
punishment is the expression of condemnation: Society gives out harsh 
punishments for serious crimes because it wants to condemn those crimes in no 
uncertain terms. 
Id. 
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B.  Arguments Against Shaming 
 
The scholarly community has not embraced this rosy view of shame 
sanctions.  In fact it has been subjected to stinted attack as having debilitat-
ing negative effects.75  One such effect is the formation of offender 
subcommunities that explicitly embrace their wrongs and defy the majority.76 
These subcommunities make it a virtue to engage in criminal activity and 
shaming will have no effect on them.77  Criminal law scholars have pointed 
to the existence of gangs where criminal activity is celebrated rather than 
abhorred as examples of such subcommunities.78  The other problem is that 
different offenders may be treated differently based on extraneous factors.79  
Professors Kahan and Posner provide the example of a gifted stockbroker 
who may not suffer in the long run from shaming for insider trading, but a 
run-of-the-mill broker may pay a heavier price.80  The potential for treating 
offenders differently is not exclusive to shame sanctions, but is a cost borne 
by any punitive system.  Critics of shame sanctions also contend that the 
purported cost-benefits of shaming are not as significant as the proponents 
would have us believe.81  The critics refer to the cost of establishing and 
maintaining a reputation, and explain that these expenditures may disappear 
when a reputation is tarnished without visible gain.82  Critics contend that 
shaming sanctions come with their own costs—namely the cost of engaging 
in the conduct engendering moral disapproval, whether it is forgoing 
otherwise profitable interactions, or the cost of conveying disapproval in 
another manner.83  Professor David Skeel notes that cost is a factor that 
should be considered in the corporate context.84 
 
                                                                                                             
75See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, 
AND THE LAW (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (discussing that shaming should be avoided in order to 
preserve human decency and individual identity); Garvey, supra note 57, at 739; Markel, supra note 
30, at 2180; Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 683 
(1997) (explaining that poor inner-city communities do not celebrate norm observation); Massaro, 
supra note 30, at 1935. 
76JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 21 (1989).  Braithwaite 
writes that "[offenders] associate with others who are perceived in some limited or total way as also 
at odds with mainstream standards."  Id. 
77Id. at 4, 21. 
78Id. 
79Kahan & Posner, supra note 30, at 372. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Massaro, supra note 30, at 1941. 
83Skeel, supra note 31, at 1819. 
84Id. at 1826.  Professor Skeel explains: 
[C]ost is a crucial variable in the corporate context because the relevant 
community—say, all shareholders of a large corporation—will frequently be far 
flung.  Placing an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal to shame the directors 
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A slightly different and more substantive critique is offered by 
Professor Toni Massaro, who argues that shaming cannot work because of 
the lack of a coherent community in the United States.85  She points out that 
the United States is not socially interdependent, and the heterogeneity in 
society creates problems of definition pertaining to the kinds of punishments 
that might engender a feeling of shame.86  While there is some merit to this 
argument, it is by no means necessary for there to be a so-called 
"community" for shaming sanctions to work.  It is sufficient that people 
share certain values or ideals with others, regardless of whether they belong 
to any kind of community that shares those values.  It is certainly the case 
that most individuals share values and norms with others.  To be sure, these 
common norms maybe few in number, and there is dispute as to what kinds 
of conduct falls under those norms, but no scholar seriously disputes their 
existence.87  In the context of CEO compensation, the entire investing public 
shares the belief that directors and CEOs should not misapply corporate 
assets for their own benefit.  This norm is the basis of our whole system of 
director liability.  Further, the corporate director universe is extremely 
interdependent.  Commercial and social linkages are so strong that no 
director can afford to ignore other actors without paying a very heavy price.  
This price can take the form of: lost business opportunities, withdrawal of 
job offers, flight of capital, collapse of company stock, the derision of peers, 
removal from other boards, and expulsion from social clubs and professional 
organizations.  Professor Massaro's point about heterogeneity is even less 
problematic in the corporate context.  Almost everyone participates in the 
market for profit, and most are likely to consider greedy behavior at their 
expense shameful.  Even if the shareholders and the company's board do not 
regard the excessive compensation agreement as shameful, the very process 
of interacting with others who do, and make it known that they do, is likely 
to make all but the most thick-skinned directors feel some degree of shame 
and embarrassment.  Thus, shaming will be an effective sanction for the 
                                                                                                             
of Sears, for instance, cost Robert Monks well over $100,000.  Because of the high 
cost of placing such advertisements, enforcers' ability to attract national media 
attention, and thus free publicity of the shaming effort, dramatically enhances the 
likelihood that shaming will have an effect.  Judicial enforcers do not face the same 
cost constraints since they can require the offending firm to bear the cost of the 
public shaming. 
Id. 
85Massaro, supra note 30, at 1883-84. 
86Id. at 1923; Note, supra note 56, at 2194 ("Thus, even if a particular community could 
theoretically impose shame on an offender, a given judge's particular method of accomplishing that 
goal may still be off the mark."). 
87John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter?  A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2151-54 (2001) (analyzing the differences in norms in multiple jurisdictions with similar legal 
systems). 
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rational actor who finds that the conduct has low utility. 
Professor Martha Nussbaum offers a different critique in her book 
Hiding from Humanity, arguing that, as legal actors, one should abjure 
shame and disgust because they allow one to hide from one's humanity.88  
This is similar to Professor Massaro's contention that shaming penalties 
convey the message that "offenders subjected to these penalties are less than 
human others who deserve our contempt."89  The dehumanizing aspect of 
shaming is also troubling to Chad Flanders, who writes, "shaming punish-
ments involve the public in an exceptionally intimate way, and risk making 
punishment into an affair of the mob: where personal vengeance rules, 
instead of professional, bureaucratic impartiality."90 
Professor Nussbaum contends that shame and disgust are never 
constructive in law.91  In circumstances where disgust has salience, she 
argues that indignation is actually the preferable emotion.92  She seems to 
build her case on the idea that disgust is not an emotion that is the product of 
logic and rationality, or has a significant correlation with the harm that the 
offender causes, but that when one feels disgust, the usual reaction is to turn 
away or recoil from the issue rather than to deal with it effectively.93  With 
regard to shame, Professor Nussbaum believes that it can spill over onto 
family members and associates of those who are shamed.  This is not unique 
to social sanctions and can have beneficial consequences—the fear that 
imposition of the sanction will tarnish family members and associates creates 
strong incentives by pressuring the offender to conform to the law or norm.  
Such influence can begin during the very early years of an individual's life, 
 
                                                                                                             
88NUSSBAUM, supra note 75, at 7. 
89Massaro, supra note 75, at 699.  Professor Massaro is further troubled by "the caste 
features of punishment" which are "jarring in a political order that makes equality a cultural 
baseline."  Id. at 699-700. 
90Flanders, supra note 34, at 16.  "Unlike imprisonment, shaming punishments require that 
citizens participate in degrading the offender: They require that citizens adopt certain negative 
attitudes towards the offender, in order that he literally feels society's disgust toward him. . . . 
Imprisonment puts punishment in the hands of disinterested professionals."  Id. 
91NUSSBAUM, supra note 75, at 231.  "[I]n shaming people as deviant, the shamers set 
themselves up as a 'normal' class above the shamed, and thus divide society into ranks and 
hierarchies."  Id. at 231-32.  But see Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, Review Essay, A 
Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and 
Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (2006) (reviewing Professor Nussbaum and critiquing her 
argument).  Huang and Anderson contend that Professor Nussbaum's argument, taken alone, is 
"insufficient to convince the reader that it is necessary to purge disgust from legal and social 
thinking."  Id.  Instead, they "draw a different conclusion from the same information, which is that 
before disgust can be potentially useful, it must be actively managed."  Id. 
92NUSSBAUM, supra note 75, at 75.  Professor Nussbaum defines "indignation" as anger 
triggered by unfairness.  Id. 
93Id. at 171.  Professor Nussbaum finds disgust "unworthy of guiding public action" and "a 
dangerous social sentiment."  Id. 
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with parents instilling values and morals with the objective of ensuring that 
the child does not grow up to become an offender.  While seemingly 
conceding that point, Professor Nussbaum seems to focus more on the 
negative consequences of shaming innocent third parties without any 
corresponding deterrence benefits, which is a problem that is not unique to 
social sanctions.  Professor Nussbaum's point about "hiding from humanity" 
might be well taken in the case of some crimes, but in the case of CEO 
greed, disgust is a constructive emotion.  The modulation of emotions 
presents adequate checks against the potential to dehumanize because the 
enforcers of the sanction are institutions rather than the masses. 
 
C.  The Internal Aspects of Shaming 
 
For shaming to work, the offender must internalize the norm that is 
allegedly violated.94  As a result of such internalization, the offender must 
believe that his or her conduct has lowered him or herself either in his own 
eyes or in the eyes of people whose opinion he or she cares about.95  In the 
absence of this internal aspect, it is hard to distinguish shame from mere 
losses or negative impacts on reputation.  While losses or negative impacts 
on reputation can be suffered even when the offender does not believe that 
he or she has committed a wrong, it is probably true that he or she can only 
feel ashamed if the alleged wrong accords with norms that have been 
internalized.  Only then will the offender feel a sense of shame when third 
parties find out about the wrong, which will in turn inspire a belief that those 
third parties think badly of him or her.  Rather than feeling any remorse, if 
the offender gets angry after being the target of a shaming sanction, it is 
likely that the offender will react with an impulse to retaliate against those 
enforcing the sanction.96  Confronted with retaliation, the enforcers, in turn, 
 
                                                                                                             
94Internalization makes the offender follow the norm regardless of its enforcement.  See 
Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for 
the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 904 (1998); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law 
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257-62 (1999). 
95Murphy, supra note 36, at 340.  Professor Murphy states: 
[T]o raise these kinds of questions—questions about the integrity and value of 
one's very self—just is to feel shame.  In psychoanalytic language, these questions 
point to a conflict between what one is or has been and the image one has of one's 
ideal self, one's ego-ideal; and, if one's ego-ideal has moral values as constitutive 
elements, then at least certain moral failures will produce, not just guilt, but shame 
as well. 
Id. 
96Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 9, at 16.  The authors note: 
The effect of anger becomes obvious once we examine the interaction of anger and 
shame.  In this case, a clear result is obtained.  Namely, second movers who were 
angry and felt no shame retaliate more and more frequently than second movers 
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might get angry and engage in a fresh round of punishment.97  Thus, 
multiple rounds of sanctioning behavior can stem from anger at the primary 
sanction, leading to potentially debilitating social effects.98  If, on the other 
hand, the offender experiences a sense of remorse, and internalizes the 
sanction, he is less likely to feel anger.  This prevents anger-induced rounds 
of sanctioning behavior, and will make the punishment more effective.99  
Studies have shown that shame and guilt can prevent angry responses to 
punishment.100  Curiously, one study showed that people who act unkindly 
are not immune from anger when they are punished for their unkindness.101  
Only when they internalized the punishment and felt shame, did they desist 
from retaliatory behavior.102  Hopfensitz and Reuben made participants play 
the game twice and found that future kindness resulted only when 
punishment induced shame.103  This presents interesting insights for 
                                                                                                             
who were angry and felt shame . . . . For second movers who were not angry, there 
are no significant differences between those who felt no shame and those who did 
. . . . 
Id. 
97Id. at 2 ("[W]e find that many individuals punish back after being punished.  In various 
cases this escalates as individuals punish each other in turns, resulting in considerable welfare losses. 
Nevertheless, this punishment institution is still effective for sustaining cooperation.").  See also 
Nikos Nikiforakis, Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still 
Govern Ourselves? (Royal Holloway, Univ. of London, 2005) (examining the effect of counter-
punishment on cooperation through the use of a public-good game experiment).  Nikiforakis' 
experiment allowed two rounds of sanctions.  Id. at 3.  After the first round of sanctions, each 
participant knew the quantity of punishment points that each individual assigned to him.  Id.  The 
second round allowed him to sanction those who sanctioned him.  Id. at 4.  This round of 
sanctioning is truly retaliatory, and is not a case of punishing those who did not adequately sanction 
free-riders.  Id.  
98Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 9, at 15 ("RESULT 2 – First movers who punish do so 
because they are angry.  High intensities of anger are triggered by opportunistic behavior by the 
second mover, especially if it is unexpected and considered unfair.  Retaliation by second movers 
also makes first movers angry and leads to additional punishment."). 
99Id. at 17 ("[O]ur results suggest that high intensities of anger provide second movers with 
a motivation to retaliate and high intensities of shame restrain them from doing so.  Furthermore, 
shame seems to be necessary for punishment to have an effect on how second movers adjust their 
behavior."). 
100Id. at 15 ("[S]econd movers who felt no shame are more likely to retaliate than other 
second movers.  Furthermore, we also find that, for second movers who were punished, experiencing 
shame induces them to correct their behavior."). 
101Id. at 19.  Hopfensitz & Reuben discovered that: 
Second movers who retaliate do so because they are angry and do not feel shame. 
 In addition, following the feeling of shame, second movers rectify their 
opportunistic behavior.  High intensities of anger are triggered by punishment, 
especially if the second mover had returned a positive amount.  High intensities of 
shame are triggered by opportunistic behavior and are not affected by 
punishment. 
Id. 
102Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 9, at 19. 
103Id. at 21.  Their experiments showed the need for monetary punishments too: "[O]ur 
results indicate that, it is the combination of feeling shame and receiving monetary punishment that 
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sanctioning excessive CEO pay.  If directors who approve the pay package 
do not believe that it is excessive, the imposition of a shame sanction is 
likely to make them angry.  Shaming will only work once they realize that 
their actions are not in the interests of shareholders, because this realization 
will inspire the internal element of shame and will motivate them to act 
differently in the future.  It is possible that they will change their actions 
even without understanding that the compensation package that they 
approved was excessive because, as rational actors, they realize the disutility 
that shaming sanctions create.  Therefore, the sanction might make them 
angry, and they might believe that it was undeserved, but they may 
nevertheless modify their behavior.  This is not the result of shame. 
Can the offender feel shame if no one knows about the wrong?  This 
is certainly possible, for most of our wrongs are only known to ourselves or 
to those closest to us.  Yet, many of us feel shame even when the wrong is 
completely unknown.104  There is a body of psychological research showing 
that people feel shame even when their offenses are hidden from others.105  
This is probably due to the sense of self that requires a certain moral 
compass, which makes one believe that by committing the wrong one has 
fallen short of that compass.  One might also feel shame by imagining the 
response of others if they were to know of the wrong, although this feeling is 
likely to be fear rather than shame.  What probably happens if one experi-
ences shame, is that one feels that one has fallen short in one's own eyes. In 
the absence of this internal element, one would be able to categorize the 
reactions of others who try to inflict shame as motivated by ill will, malice, 
envy, jealousy, or some other emotion.  After such categorization, it would 
be relatively easy to be unaffected by the attempts at shaming.  If other 
people share this categorization, or can be persuaded to believe that no 
wrong has been committed, or that one's actions were justified in the 
circumstances, these attempts at shaming would have little or no power.  
Thus, the most important element in the shaming troika (offender, wrong, 
and audience) is clearly the offender.  Shaming can work if there is no 
wrong, and if there is no audience, but it clearly cannot work if the offender 
does not internalize the norm.  Despite this, Judge Richard Posner, along 
with other legal writers,106 finds it sufficient that other people engage in 
                                                                                                             
has a significant effect on behavior.  This suggests that shame alone will not have an effect if the 
cooperative norm is not actively enforced."  Id. 
104Some sociologists differentiate shame from guilt by the visibility of offense.  If the 
offense is visible to others, under this view, shame is the appropriate emotion.  If, on the other hand, 
the offense has not been observed by others, guilt is the appropriate emotion.  See Eugene Kandel & 
Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 801, 806 (1992).  
105June Price Tangney et al., Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions?, 70 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCYHOL. 1256, 1257 (1996). 
106Ellickson, supra note 27, at 5 (pointing out that norms scholars continue to base their 
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deliberate attempts at shaming, thereby preferring to define shaming along 
purely the external dimension.107  Although Judge Posner recognizes that 
shaming has two dimensions—that the offender will feel shame or guilt108 
(i.e., the internal aspect of shaming), and that it might trigger sanctions that 
third parties impose, such as cutting off relationships, terminating 
employment, and physical pain (i.e., the external aspect)—he focuses 
primarily on the second dimension.  Judge Posner is certainly not alone in 
his emphasis on the role that bystanders play in enforcing norms by punish-
ing norm-breakers through social sanctions such as dirty looks, disparaging 
remarks, ostracism, and the like.109 
The problem with auto-shame is that no wrong is necessary for it to 
occur.  We frequently feel ashamed about the many stupid things that we say 
or do, although they may not in themselves be wrongs or offenses.  The 
sense of shame that we feel in these contexts is often tied to our conception 
of the image we imagine we possess, and our feeling that our actions 
undermine or negatively impact that image.  It is certainly possible that this 
image is a figment of our imaginations, and that we are indeed too foolish to 
realize that our actions do not cause a negative impact.  Thus, there is no 
need to feel shame. 
Judge Posner writes that one can feel shame even when the action 
does not violate an internalized norm.110  The examples he provides are 
                                                                                                             
work on rational choice theory). 
107Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 371 (1999).  The authors explain: 
We shall treat humiliation as a form of shame, and shame itself as (1) a purely 
external sanction for (2) violations of the moral code.  It is important to note, 
however, that even when viewed purely as an external sanction, that is, as the 
product of the actions or reactions of other people, shame (like guilt) is felt even if 
other people take no action. 
Id. 
108Id. 
109See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992) (discussing the importance 
of reputational concerns in ensuring compliance with industry norms); Robert D. Cooter, 
Symposium, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating 
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665, 1668-69 (1996) (suggesting third party 
enforcement is important in explaining emergence of norms); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and 
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("[A] norm is like a law, except that a 
private person sanctions the violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a 
law."); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915 (1996) 
(discussing norms as enforced through social sanctions).  
110Posner & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 371.  Judge Posner & Professor Rasmussen 
explain that: 
[o]ne can also be shamed (though the better word here would be "humiliated") for 
conduct that violates a moral code not one's own, where there is no question of 
guilt.  During the Cultural Revolution in China, people paraded through the streets 
in dunce caps felt humiliated even if they disapproved of the regime and therefore 
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actually examples of humiliation rather than shame.111  Thus, directors could 
feel a sense of humiliation because norms entrepreneurs publicize a 
compensation agreement that exemplifies CEO greed at its worst, even 
though they themselves have no internalized norm against excessive greed. 
 
D.  Processual Objections 
 
Some scholars have developed other critiques that focus on the lack of 
processual fairness in deploying shame sanctions.112  The ready resort to 
shaming without due opportunity for the other side to adequately defend 
itself is a serious limitation that is hard to remedy.  There is also something 
unsavory about trials in the media without the opportunity for cold reason 
and logic to be the primary means of discourse.113  Another problem is that 
shaming might go too far and succeed too much in punishing the alleged 
offender.114  It might also be that actors with particular political agendas that 
the majority does not share will engage in shaming, and people will be 
victimized even if they have done nothing wrong.115  Unlike the case with 
legal sanctions, there is nothing in the process to protect against this political 
deployment of shame sanctions.  It would be a travesty if different directors 
were treated differently based on different interest groups deciding to use 
shame inconsistently.  Interest group capture is a realistic fear in cases of 
deploying shame sanctions against directors and CEOs.  Trade unions and 
employee groups have a particular interest in curtailing CEO pay and these 
groups are getting increasingly more vocal in the proxy process.  A left-wing 
trade union's idea of excessive pay might be very different from that of many 
other market participants, making the deployment of shame sanctions based 
on political ideologies a threat to their efficacy. 
 
                                                                                                             
felt no guilt at violating its norms. 
Id. 
111Id. 
112Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy 
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-7, 9, 11-12 (1991). 
113Whitman, supra note 30, at 1088 (worrying that shaming confers too much "enforcement 
power to a fickle and uncontrolled general populace"). 
114The suicide of a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he believed to be thirteen 
years of age following a Dateline NBC sting is a sobering reminder of the dangerous consequences 
of shaming.  See Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Raid Over Child Sex, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2006, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile.html?ex 
=1320555600&en=9a849fc4db0dzzzz28ce&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
115Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 601, 635-636 n.89 (2006) (citing Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in 
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 825 (1993)). 
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E.  Shaming Overload 
 
Professor Massaro contends that the enormous scale of communica-
tions necessitated by the nature of the community would contribute to an 
"overload."116  If the number of instances of shame sanctions rise, inevitably 
there will be an increase in the number of people who might not participate 
in shaming.  However, this does enhance the possibility of diluting the norm 
that shaming seeks to enforce.  If, for example, the number of offenders 
wearing pink shirts were to become so common as to lose its potential for 
sticking out, it is unlikely that those wearing pink shirts will experience 
unpleasant attention from onlookers.  This could lead to the very norm 
sought to be enforced losing its potency, and it could eventually lose its 
status as a norm.  In the context of pink shirts, this is precisely what has 
transpired.  Harel and Klement write that the loss of potency creates a 
dissonance 
between the law's disapproval of the illegal act, and the 
willingness of individuals to overlook it. Increasing the rate of 
shaming may therefore fail not only in substituting for 
traditional sanctions' deterrent functions, but also in reinforcing 
community's cooperation with the law.  Thus, an increased rate 
of shaming may paradoxically undermine the law's expressive 
value.117 
They write that two models—a "Bounded Information Model" and a "Group 
Formation Model"—explain the decrease in effectiveness.118  According to 
the Bounded Information Model, as more offenders are shamed, it becomes 
harder for non-offenders to identify and isolate the offenders, with the result 
that the offender does not suffer the consequences of shaming.119  According 
 
                                                                                                             
116Massaro, supra note 30, at 1930.  See also Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics 
of Shame: Why More Shaming May Deter Less 15 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Mtgs., 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789244 (analyzing the effectiveness of shame sanctions).  
Harel and Klement make a similar point:  
[I]t is particularly important to notice that increasing the rate of detection decreases 
the deterrent effects of shaming since it increases the number of shamed 
individuals in the society and, as was shown earlier, such an increase decreases the 
expected costs of shaming due to the larger search costs it imposes on law-abiding 
individuals.  Conflicting effects may of course outweigh this effect. 
Id. at 15. 
117Harel & Klement, supra note 116, at 21-22 ("Shaming penalties can be 'self destructive' 
as an extensive use of them may erode their effectiveness."). 
118Id. at 22 n.38. 
119Id. 
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to the Group Formation Model, which is similar to the point made about 
deviant subcommunities, an increase in the number of shamed offenders 
empowers these offenders to form groups, with the result that shaming is less 
effective.120  They also write that "the more people shamed, the lesser the 
ability of law-abiding individuals to form law-abiding communities."121  This 
is curious given that it is inconceivable that more people will not be in the 
offender group at any given time than the law-abiding group.  The 
proportion of the shamers to the shamed at all times must be quite high if the 
norm is to have any meaning.  Otherwise, the norm will be deviance, rather 
than the conduct proscribed by the law.  
These arguments about overload have some truth to them, but the 
problem of overload is not unique to shame.  It could be argued that the 
enormous growth in the population over the last four decades, and the 
consequent increase in the number of offenders, has resulted in an overload 
of imprisonment.  Further, the number of values or norms that characterize 
the relevant corporate community is rather small in comparison with the 
number of crimes that might exist in a national legal system.  The fact that 
the number of possible offenders is limited to the number of directors and 
CEOs that exist at any given point in time, limits the possibility that the 
community is unable to identify the offender due to the overload.  This 
overcomes some of the significant challenges that Professor Massaro points 
out about the nature of the community and the problem of identification. 
 
III.  SOCIAL NORMS AND SHAMING 
 
Social sanctions can only serve as an effective means of achieving 
desirable conduct when they reinforce social norms or law.122  There is now 
a large body of literature on social norms123 that sheds light on the expressive 
 
                                                                                                             
120Id. 
121Harel & Klement, supra note 116, at 22 n.38. 
122See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349 (1997) (arguing that society needs to create programs that promote lawful activities and 
denounce unlawful ones); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the 
Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 805 (1998) (examining scholarly literature on criminal law 
policy dealing with social norms). 
123See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
943 (1995) & The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The 
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 
87 AM. ECON. L. REV. 365 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 109.  Due to the number of scholars at the 
University of Chicago doing this work, some have referred to it as the "New Chicago School." 
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dimensions of labeling conduct as pro-social or antisocial.124  This scholar-
ship could provide a rich vein of material for the issue of CEO compensation 
because the literature emphasizes the role of groups, and the participation of 
actors therein.  Norms theorists argue, for instance, that law interacts with 
social norms by strengthening them to facilitate pro-social behavior.  The 
paradigmatic example is the deployment of social norms by nonsmokers 
emboldened by the passage of laws against smoking in public areas to 
achieve compliance with the law in ways that are beyond what the legal 
system itself could achieve.125  Scholars like Professor Cass Sunstein write 
that a change in the law can inspire a change in preferences.126  He calls this 
the "expressive" function of law.127  Norms theorists also focus on changes 
in social meaning that the legal system can cause, and the positive 
correlation that such signaling can have on pro-social behavior.128  The 
principal example for this idea is the broken window theory.129  This theory 
explains how fixing broken windows has a positive effect on crime rates by 
showing potential offenders that the neighborhood is unlikely to tolerate 
untidiness, much less criminal behavior.130  Attaching a legal sanction to 
conduct can serve to engender displeasure and social condemnation.  
Specifically, entitling people to impose their own forms of sanctions against 
offenders conveys a message to potential offenders that social sanctions can 
exist apart from legal sanctions.  While nonsmokers had, for a considerable 
 
                                                                                                             
124McAdams, supra note 123, at 341-43. 
125See Cooter, supra note 12, at 595. 
126See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 
217, 230-34 (1993). 
127Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 
(1996). 
128Kahan, supra note 122, at 352-53. 
129James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29; Meares & Kahan, supra note 122, at 822-23.  
Professors Meares and Kahan explain: 
Order maintenance is likely to prevent crime through its effect on social influence. 
Social influence theory posits that individuals are more likely to commit crimes 
when they perceive that others are either engaged in or expecting crime. One of 
[sic] primary cues that crime is tolerated or expected is visible public 
disorder. . . . Order-maintenance policing can help to reverse these effects. When 
citizens obey norms of orderliness—and when authorities visibly respond to those 
who don't—onlookers see that the community does not tolerate criminality. This 
reverses the social influence effects. 
Meares & Kahan, supra note 122, at 823.  For a critique of this theory, see Bernard E. Harcourt & 
Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social 
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006) ("Taken together, the evidence from New York City and 
from the five-city social experiment provides no support for a simple first-order disorder-crime 
relationship as hypothesized by Wilson and Keeling nor for the proposition that broken windows 
policing is the optimal use of scarce law enforcement resources."). 
130Meares & Kahan, supra note 122, at 823-24. 
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time, borne the costs of secondhand smoke, the passage of antismoking laws 
seems to make them much less tolerant of smokers.131  As a result, the 
antismoking measures work despite negligible legal enforcement.132  Thus, 
the law relies on this decentralized and privatized empowerment for its teeth. 
Curiously, since the power of social norms seems to be at odds with 
rational self-interested behavior, the result is that social norms constrain 
people to give up otherwise self-interested actions.133  Shaming and other 
social sanctions can only be effective in constraining excessive CEO pay if 
actors have internalized a norm against it.  Behavioral economists have 
conducted several experiments showing that considerations of equity and 
fairness constrain subjects despite the opportunity to be greedy and self-
regarding.134  Several interesting problems crop up when one attempts to 
apply the social norms scholarship to the problem of runaway CEO pay.  
First, there exists the perpetual conflict between various social norms, each 
vying for primacy.  Aliter, the social norm that greed is good, competes with 
another social norm favoring equity and correspondence between 
contribution and compensation.  It is difficult to determine which norm 
should triumph.  However, it must be recognized that a law defying a social 
norm by encouraging greed at all costs is likely to fail.  Professor Robert 
Ellickson's famous study in Shasta County shows that the way in which 
neighboring ranchers allocate the costs of straying cattle is based on the 
community's norms and does not seem to be dependent on the law's 
allocation of these costs.135  Professor Richard McAdams supports this view 
and argues that dissonance between law and social norms makes enforcing 
laws against antisocial conduct difficult.136 
Why, then are social norms so important?  How is it that social norms 
are more powerful than positive law, backed up by the might of the state?  
One theory norms scholars offer pertains to the enormous value that people 
place in belonging to groups.  If membership is so valuable, the argument is 
that people will go a long way to preserve that membership, and thus 
expulsion from the group serves as a powerful sanction.  A pioneering study 
 
                                                                                                             
131McAdams, supra note 123, at 404. 
132Professor Robert Cooter has written that although laws against smoking in public are 
almost never enforced, compliance is widespread, which suggests that labeling the behavior as a 
crime will heighten potential violators' fear of social sanctions, and might also encourage a real 
increase in social sanctions against violators.  See Cooter, supra note 12, at 595. 
133See McAdams, supra note 123, at 340-41; Sunstein, supra note 109, at 911-12. 
134See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and 
Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 216-18 (1995). 
135Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
537, 540 (1998). 
136McAdams, supra note 123, at 349. 
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by Professor Lisa Bernstein focusing on the diamond industry showed that 
the persistence of industry customs can be explained by the value placed by 
members on belonging to the industry group.137   This puts a lid on members' 
proclivities to attempt to gain advantages by short-term competitive 
behavior—based on the idea that these short-term benefits are smaller than 
those provided by membership in the group.138 
Another prominent theorist has proposed a model based on esteem—
the underlying idea is that we value what other people think about us, and 
thus concede our unfettered autonomy by belonging to groups.139  Professor 
McAdams bases his thesis on the idea that humans are social animals, and 
that acceptance by others is inherently important.140  The core assumption of 
esteem theory is that people have a preference for something that others can 
give or withhold at zero cost: esteem.141  The assumption serves to avoid the 
collective action problem of norm enforcement.  Because esteem is costless 
it is not subject to a free-rider problem.  Although the preference for esteem 
is assumed to be slight, Professor McAdams shows that it can explain even 
very costly norm-guided behavior.142  It does not matter that other rewards 
flow from acceptance by others.  If acceptance is its own reward, then people 
will behave in ways aimed at attaining acceptance, even in the absence of 
other rewards, and even in the presence of other costs.143  Thus, purely self-
interested behavior will be constrained to the extent that it invites 
disapprobation, or fails to win approbation. 
Group or club membership also has other significant purposes—for 
example, group membership may signal the type of person one is to 
onlookers.144  By belonging to the Sierra Club, one may signal one's 
environmental friendliness, or by belonging to the National Rifle 
Association, one might signal one's endorsement of the right to bear arms.  
In many instances, the benefits of such membership far outweigh the costs of 
such signaling and people might join purely for that reason, regardless of 
whether they agree with the ideology of the group.145  Some scholars give the 
example of voting as having a trivial benefit in terms of costs and benefits 
 
                                                                                                             
137Bernstein, supra note 109, at 157. 
138McAdams, supra note 123, at 355. 
139Id. at 355-57. 
140Id. 
141Id. at 365. 
142McAdams, supra note 123, at 365. 
143A similar idea is contained in the peer-pressure based model of Kandel and Lazear.  See 
Kandel & Lazear, supra note 104, at 816.  
144Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 765, 766-67 (1998). 
145Id. 
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(the idea is that each individual vote may be worth little), but people vote 
because of the message it conveys that the voter is a responsible member of 
society.146  Studies have shown that groups establish norms even in incipient 
or protean conditions, and that these norms seem to persist even when the 
group is absent.147 
Social norms do exist in corporate law.148  Some scholars have pointed 
to the fact that despite the absence of clear legal standards and liability in 
many instances, corporate boards act in ways that are, at least facially, geared 
at ensuring that they act in the best interests of their shareholders.149  Other 
writers claim that there is "compelling evidence that sin stocks are less held 
or followed by certain institutions and analysts who discriminate against sin 
stocks."150  This sort of conduct can be explained by the operation of social 
sanctions.151  Scholars argue that actors do the right thing because of the fear 
of shame or embarrassment.152  Perhaps inevitably, such arguments lead 
them to espouse a minimal role for legal sanctions and courts.153  Other 
corporate norms theorists dispute this thesis, expressing skepticism about the 
ability of social sanctions to be more effective than legal sanctions.154  They 
contend that nonlegal sanctions are only a "weak constraint on opportunism 
within firms."155  The nub of their argument appears to be that directors can 
be motivated to act appropriately by notions of altruism.156  According to 
 
                                                                                                             
146Id. at 783-85. 
147Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1548 
(2000) (identifying possible flaws in the value of using social norms).  
148Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (2001). 
149See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1010-11 (1997); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and 
Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
675, 683 (2002). 
150Hong & Kacperczyk, supra note 10, at 22.  The authors explain: 
Our findings on the effects of social norms in the context of the stock market 
strongly support the viewpoint that social norms can have important consequences 
for markets. Indeed, our results most likely represent lower bounds on the effects 
of social norms in the stock market, since many companies operating in sin 
industries may not become public precisely because they are shunned by many 
investors. 
Id. at 6. 
151See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 1269-70. 
152See Rock, supra note 149, at 1013; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 
1641 (2001); Skeel, supra note 31, at 1823–24. 
153Rock & Wachter, supra note 148, at 1666–67. 
154Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1741-42 (2001). 
155Id. at 1796. 
156Id. at 1809-10. 
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them, the law can help to facilitate this "by articulating a social expectation 
that directors will exercise due care."157  Courts perform an important 
framing function in their scheme.158  The empirical support for this altruistic 
model appears to be founded on social dilemma studies demonstrating that 
individuals are not always selfish, but frequently engage in "other-
regarding"159 behavior even at a cost to themselves.160  Scholars have even 
suggested that altruism might play a positive role in reining in excessive 
CEO compensation.161 
There are interesting results from ultimatum games162 that might be 
instructive in the application of social norms to the CEO compensation area. 
Despite economic theory suggesting that the proposer should offer the lowest 
amount possible, and that the responder should accept that low amount on 
the understanding that something is better than nothing, experimental results 
show that the proposer usually offers a substantial part of the money, often 
half.163  Experiments also show that if the proposer does not offer a 
substantial part, the responder frequently rejects the offer, knowing full well 
that he will get nothing.164  This suggests that the proposer's desire to get as 
much of the money as possible is balanced by the fear that greedy action will 
invite rejection by the responder.165  There may be lessons that can be drawn 
 
                                                                                                             
157Id. at 1744.  Professors Blair and Stout write that "[w]hen the Delaware chancery court 
trumpets the importance of careful attention to fiduciary duties, directors and officers are likely to 
heed that call—even though they may have little or no external incentive for doing so."  Id. at 1797. 
158Blair & Stout, supra note 154, at 1796. ("[C]ase law . . . can encourage corporate 
participants to internalize norms of cooperation through social framing—providing information 
about the social context of relationships within the firm."). 
159Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite 
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2003) (explaining other-
regarding behavior as when "people behave as if they care about something other than their own 
payoffs"). 
160Id. at 15.  Professor Stout suggests that "directors might be inclined to behave in an other-
regarding fashion simply because a respected authority asks them to do so." 
161Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh's Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and 
Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 815–19 
(2003) (advocating the application of altruistic theory to resolve the problem of excessive executive 
compensation). 
162An ultimatum game features two players—a proposer and a responder.  The proposer is 
given some money and told that he can offer any part of it to the responder. The responder has the 
choice of accepting or rejecting the offer.  If he accepts, he gets what the proposer offered.  If he 
rejects, both players gets nothing. 
163Camerer & Thaler, supra note 134, at 210; Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus 
Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773 (2000). 
164Camerer & Thaler, supra note 134, at 210. 
165See Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms 12 (Georgetown 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 265,902, Mar. 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
265902.  Professor Stout explains: 
[The results] suggest[] not only that people may have other-regarding preferences, 
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from these results.  The responder's ability to reject, and thereby ensure that 
the proposer gets nothing, is key to the proposer's willingness to distribute a 
substantial part of the money in the first place.  If shareholders are to be in 
the position of the responder, they have to have the ability to sanction the 
proposer (CEO) in the same way.  A sine qua non for this to happen is that 
shareholders must know the exact details of the CEO compensation package, 
and be in a position to accept or reject it.166  If all CEO compensation 
packages are subjected to shareholder approval, it is possible that ultimatum 
game results can be approximated.  I doubt if they can be exactly duplicated 
because of the collective action problem.  Professor Bebchuk argues that 
shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation would "express the 
collective judgment of the shareholders about the quality of the company's 
pay arrangements.  An expression of widespread shareholder dissatisfaction 
would provide a valuable signal to the board. . . . [and publicity] would 
apply some pressure on the board to take the shareholders' preferences into 
account."167  Even after the package has been approved, there is the 
possibility that bystanders can engage in sanctioning behavior. 
 
A.  Is There a Social Norm Against Excessive CEO Pay? 
 
Professor Robert Cooter defines a social norm as conduct that society 
agrees people ought to engage in.168  He writes that agreement about what 
                                                                                                             
but that they know that other people may have other-regarding preferences.  That 
possibility in turn suggests that other-regarding preferences influence human 
behavior at at least two levels. 
 At the first level, other-regarding preferences can cause some people to 
sacrifice to either help or to harm others around them.  In other words, people who 
have other-regarding preferences will behave differently than they would if they 
were purely selfish. 
 At the second level, the knowledge that some people have other-regarding 
preferences will lead other people to alter their behavior in reliance upon this 
possibility—even if those others are themselves are purely selfish. 
Id. at 12-13. 
166See Lucian Bebchuk, Investors Must Have Power, Not Just Figures on Pay, FIN. TIMES, 
July 28, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d5b258e-1dd5-11db-bf06-0000779e2340. 
html. 
167Written Testimony, supra note 5, at 4.  Professor Bebchuk notes elsewhere that 
shareholder resolutions have been ignored.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 877 (2005). 
168Cooter, supra note 12, at 587.  Professor Ellickson defines norms as rules of behavior that 
are enforced primarily by third parties other than state agents.  See Ellickson, supra note 27, at 5.  
According to Judge Posner and Professor Rasmussen, 
[a] norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either 
promulgation or enforcement.  Examples range from table manners and the rules of 
grammar to country club regulations and standard business practice.  Norms may 
be independent of laws, as in the examples just given, or may overlap them; there 
are norms against stealing and lying, but also laws against these behaviors. 
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people ought to do is indicative of a possible social norm, but disagreement 
might be suggestive of a struggle to establish a social norm.169  This, 
however, is not a sufficient condition for the establishment of a social 
norm.170  Professor Cooter's formulation requires that the social norm be an 
"effective consensus obligation"—that is, people must not only agree that a 
social norm exists, but must act in accordance with that norm.171  He gives 
due attention to a somewhat neglected aspect of social norms—the internal-
ization element—writing that people make a moral commitment when they 
internalize a social norm.172  Professor Cooter's emphasis on internalization 
is a richer formulation that contrasts with several other scholars who seem to 
be content to rely upon norms enforced by third parties without much regard 
for the impact on the offender beyond considerations such as negatively 
affected reputation.  Their analysis is largely consequentialist in the sense 
that they are satisfied with conduct changing regardless of whether it is 
because the offender feels a sense of guilt or shame, or because he or she 
wants to minimize the costs associated with third party enforcement without 
feeling any sense of wrongfulness.  In order for this to work, third parties 
must be willing to be the enforcers.  They might be willing to pay this price, 
for example, under the Posner model, because they want to signal to 
potential partners that they are trustworthy "good types" to deal with.173  
Under the McAdams model, third parties would be enforcers because of the 
low costs associated with enforcement—they can bestow or withhold esteem 
at no personal cost.174 
Professor Cooter distinguishes between the consequences of internali-
zation in cooperative and noncooperative settings, stating that internalization 
can be beneficial in the former.175  It is precisely this scenario that occurs in 
the case of excessive CEO compensation.  If CEOs structure their 
                                                                                                             
Posner & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 369. 
169Cooter, supra note 12, at 587. 
170Id. 
171Id. 
172Id. at 586. 
173See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18 (2000) (explaining that "good types" 
are more likely to cooperate than "bad types" and therefore obtain mutual gains). 
174McAdams, supra note 123, at 355-75. 
175Cooter, supra note 12, at 587.  See also McAdams, supra note 123, at 343-46 (emphasiz-
ing that people obey internalized norms even when they would suffer no legal consequences if they 
disobeyed them).  Professor Cooter writes: 
In a noncooperative setting, moral restraint is a disadvantage, rather like fighting 
with one hand tied behind your back.  In cooperation ventures, however, moral 
restraint can increase productivity, so people with good character may enjoy an 
advantage over people with bad character.  For example, agents who faithfully 
serve their principals increase the productivity of principal-agent relationships by 
reducing monitoring costs. 
Cooter, supra note 12, at 587. 
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compensation agreements solely with the goal of receiving as much money 
as possible, regardless of their performance and length of service, it is 
inevitable that shareholders and regulators will work towards monitoring 
both compensation agreements and subsequent performance with greater 
vigor.  This will divert resources away from more productive uses.  While 
both shareholders and CEOs will bear these costs, it is probable that the 
CEOs will bear the brunt of them.  This is due to the relatively large number 
of shareholders, which reduces individual costs for each shareholder.  
Further, this is also due to the fact that several egregious compensation 
agreements will be unraveled by the increased scrutiny.  Thus, while the 
brilliant CEO will still command a high compensation package, the mediocre 
CEOs will suffer heavily because of this increased monitoring.  Given this 
reality, all CEOs would be better off internalizing a social norm against 
excessive compensation and not being too greedy. 
The crux of Professor Cooter's argument is that positive law can 
influence rational actors to change their character.176  Thus, if a law 
sanctions CEO greed, it is likely that CEOs will be less greedy.  Given the 
costs associated with this, Professor Cooter seems to imply that shaming can 
achieve the same result at a lower cost.  If there is any possibility of 
publicizing egregiously high CEO pay, it is likely that CEOs will be less 
greedy since they will not want to appear as greedy.  Curbing excessive CEO 
pay signals to shareholders that they can rely on the CEO to manage the 
company's assets in a manner most beneficial to shareholders.  Excessive 
CEO pay, on the other hand, signals to shareholders that individuals holding 
CEO positions are not good participants in cooperative settings and that they 
are not good managers of the shareholders' assets.  This can only work if the 
agreements are made public prior to their being signed, as the signaling has 
impact only before the CEO is hired.  In many cases, the CEO may not be in 
the market for another job after he or she has become CEO of a particular 
company.177  If, however, the information is released prior to hiring, and the 
shareholders decide that the demands are excessive, shareholders of other 
companies where this person may be a CEO candidate, will be signaled that 
he or she is not a "good type," negatively impacting the person's market-
ability.  A law requiring disclosure of proposed pay prior to CEO hiring can 
influence the internalization of a norm against excessive pay.  In the case of 
 
                                                                                                             
176Cooter, supra note 12, at 603-06. 
177Stout, supra note 165, at 20.  Professor Stout explains: 
[E]xternal incentives, alone, can only influence the behavior of the rationally 
selfish actor when two criteria are met.  First, her behavior must be observable to 
others. Second, some one (or something) must be both willing and able to reward 
her good behavior and to punish her bad behavior—and to reward or punish 
sufficiently. 
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directors, the signaling function is served both before and after the 
compensation package has been approved because directors frequently have 
an interest in being reelected and in being appointed to other boards. 
There is considerable evidence supporting the view that rational actors 
behave in ways that are other-regarding.  The expectations of others appear 
to be a key determinant in several experimental studies.178  These studies 
show that such expectations only play a role up to the point when they are in 
conflict with self-interest.  An analysis of social dilemma games found that 
as the personal cost incurred by cooperating in a social dilemma rises, 
cooperation rates tended to fall.179  Studies show that if a proposer offers a 
relatively larger share, the likelihood that the responder will spitefully reject 
it decreases.180  Thus, people are only willing to be spiteful if the cost of 
being spiteful is not too high.  While this is true for participants in the game, 
spite might be costless to observers, and they might step into the breach and 
engage in spiteful behavior to ensure that proposers are honest.  Thus, while 
shareholders might evaluate the cost of spiteful behavior and conclude that it 
is too high, observers who are not shareholders in that corporation can 
engage in spiteful behavior at little or no cost.  This can serve as a sufficient 
sanction for enforcing the social norm. 
Creating a norm can only occur if people know about it and are aware 
of the sanctions that come with violation.  This is where norm entrepreneurs 
have a powerful role to play.  They are likely to be much more successful at 
creating norms than the state.181  It must be recognized that creating norms 
takes time—establishing a norm against CEO greed is not a day's task.  
Norms are creatures with a long gestation period, and acceptable conduct 
does not become unacceptable without conditioning.  It is here that norm 
entrepreneurs can play a powerful role, frequently with the assistance of the 
law.  The law can change the social meaning of conduct, and norms 
entrepreneurs can use this to create conducive circumstances for 
conditioning.  Andreas Engert writes that norm creation is substantially 
facilitated by "network effects."182  According to him: 
 
                                                                                                             
178Stout, supra note 159, at 9-10. 
179David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of 
Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 58, 75-79 (1995). 
180Stout, supra note 159, at 12. 
181Posner & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 379.  Judge Posner & Professor Rasmussen 
make a similar point about nongovernmental organizations: "Nongovernmental organizations may be 
more effective than either individuals or governments in this regard, but it is not clear whether a 
society that gives ample scope to norm-changing organizations will have more or less norm creation 
and stability."  Id. 
182Andreas Engert, Norms, Rationality, and Communication: A Reputation Theory of Social 
Norms 10 (Aug. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=323020. 
"Heroes" may trigger the emergence of a new norm by incurring sacrifices.  So 
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If a proposed norm would have strong network effects, players 
are sensitive to whether or not it will become effective.  
Accordingly, players tend to provide incentives for others to 
inform them, i.e. to speak out about their own opinion as well 
as the opinion distribution over the population.  However, this 
interest only exists if the proposal is a serious candidate for 
becoming the norm.  If it is not, players are especially 
uninterested even if, in substance, they would strongly prefer 
the norm to be introduced.183 
B.  The Cost of Enforcing Social Sanctions 
To be sure, inflicting any kind of sanction is costly.184  Even in the 
McAdams esteem model,185 the very act of withholding esteem is not as 
costless as he suggests.  The enforcer is not free from costs just because he 
or she only withholds esteem—this may cause a tear in existing friendships, 
for example.  The enforcer of the sanction still has to pay a price, even when 
the sanction is relatively passive like shunning or avoiding the wrongdoer.186 
                                                                                                             
long as their endeavor is that of a few dispersed individuals their sacrifice remains 
futile.  If they fail they are ridiculed.  However, if they succeed they trigger a 
competition for compliance up to the point where the proposal has become the new 
standard.  One crucial condition of success for a hero is to be a "norm 
entrepreneur" at the same time, that is, to convey to their audience why the new 
behavior is useful and thus deserves esteem (or reputation).  Hence the mixture of 
eloquence and resoluteness that accounts for charismatic leadership. 
Id. at 30-31. 
183Id. at 12-13. 
184See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 209-11 (1981); Doron 
Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective On Megan's Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 355, 363 (2005) ("In the context of [Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws 
(SORNLs)], for example, these costs include setting up notification websites, updating these 
websites, tracking down offenders, and actively notifying communities.").  Teichman further asserts 
that: 
[n]on-legal sanctions are unique because through their use, the government can 
externalize some of the costs of sanctioning to the public.  The amount of sanctions 
inflicted can therefore be raised without tapping into a limited government budget. 
Not only is this true of the cost of non-legal sanctions, which are quite obviously 
born by the sanctioning public, but is also true with respect to the costs of inducing 
non-legal sanctions. 
Id. at 364 n.38. 
185The esteem model has traction in the CEO compensation context because people with 
high self-esteem are more likely to respond to the withholding of esteem.  See Jones, supra note 13, 
at 144. 
186See Julia A. Houston, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War 
on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-33 (1994) (pointing out problems of implementing SORNLs 
associated with their costs);  Denise M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, Continuing Debate Over 
Megan's Law. Some Question Whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime.  The State Statute is Set to 
Expire Next Year, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at B2 (noting that registration verification would cost 
36 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 32 
 
 There may be awkwardness experienced when the enforcer unintentionally 
comes into contact with the offender, or during a direct confrontation by the 
offender demanding to know why the enforcer is acting that way.  
Regardless of what the sanction is, there is little doubt that there is a cost, 
measured by the enforcer's position post-sanction relative to the enforcer's 
position pre-sanction.  In many instances, this cost is only borne by the 
enforcer, whereas even the bystander who chooses to look the other way 
might benefit.187  To be sure, there may be secondary benefits that may 
accrue to the enforcer.  One secondary benefit might be the conveyance of an 
appearance of courage, integrity, and willingness to enforce the norm.  This 
adds up to showing that the enforcer is a "good type."  Some scholars 
characterize these parties as "shame-centered enforcers."188  By showing that 
he or she is a "good type," the enforcer could also be trying to stave off a 
sanction against passivity that other enforcers might impose.189  This 
sanction might take the form of the passive person being labeled a coward, 
being shunned as a person without a strong moral core, and so on.  There are 
instances when people who do not participate in consumer boycotts have 
received various punishments, apparently exemplifying the fact that passivity 
may not always be costless.190  This secondary sanctioning is an important 
component that is missing from the analysis of legal scholars who write 
about shaming.  In the absence of effective secondary shaming, the free-rider 
problem becomes a serious obstacle to the effective deployment of shame 
                                                                                                             
the state $15 million to $20 million which is a "hefty request" given the California budget deficit). 
187See McAdams, supra note 123, at 352-53. 
188See Harel & Klement, supra note 116, at 5.  They explain: 
[Shame-centered enforcers] do not care whether the individuals they interact with 
are offenders or not.  They are, however, reluctant to interact with shamed 
individuals.  Such reluctance may be attributed to the unwillingness to be publicly 
observed interacting with shamed individuals.  Interaction with the shamed might 
signal to third parties that those interacting with them are also "bad types." 
Id. at 5. 
189This is the idea behind the signaling theory postulated by Professor Eric Posner, whereby 
people are either "cooperators," who have a low discount rate, or "cheaters," who have a high 
discount rate.  Cooperators and cheaters all play repeated games in which the former maximize their 
payoffs by interacting among themselves.  To exclude cheaters, cooperators can use costly signals 
that only individuals who expect the high cooperative payoff can afford to send.  The cost incurred 
by the sanctioning party is exactly what makes the infliction of the nonlegal sanction a credible 
signal.  People who are passive are seen to be non-cooperators, and are excluded from profitable 
interactions with cooperators.  See Posner, supra note 144, at 767-72. 
190See MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS AFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE 
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 136 (1999) (describing how the Jewish boycott against German 
goods during World War II was rigorously enforced by nonlegal sanctions); William Muraskin, The 
Harlem Boycott of 1934: Black Nationalism and the Rise of Labor-Union Consciousness, 13 
LABOR HISTORY 361, 365 (1972) (presenting a case in which the photographs of boycott violators 
were published in a local newspaper); Sankar Sen et al., Withholding Consumption: A Social 
Dilemma Perspective on Consumer Boycotts, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 399, 401 (2001) (pointing out 
the connection between consumer boycotts and group membership). 
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sanctions.191 
This might suggest that enforcers must engage in a cost-benefit 
calculus, unless they are content to impose the sanction regardless of cost, 
perhaps for principle, altruism, or some similar reason.  If such a calculation 
is inevitable, then the enforcer will quickly realize that several types of 
sanctions are possible, each with a different cost.  If he or she chooses the 
shunning sanction, the cost is likely to be the opportunity cost of interacting 
with the offender, which itself varies with the unique attributes of the 
offender.  If the offender is a close relative or friend, opportunities for 
interaction are likely to be frequent, and shunning might require more effort. 
If, on the other hand, the offender is a director who uses the same country 
club, shunning may not be terribly costly.  If the enforcer chooses shaming, 
the cost is clearly greater than the cost of shunning.  The enforcer has to 
undertake more positive actions such as spreading the word about the 
offender's bad conduct, with the increased risk of confrontation by the 
offender.  The choice to impose any sanction is made in this way.  The 
enforcer might conclude that he or she is willing to pay the price that 
shunning presents, but is unwilling to pay the price of shaming.  In other 
words, shunning is more affordable than shaming. 
If it is clear that all sanctions come with costs, we must delve into the 
reasons for enforcers being willing to bear that cost.  Experiments conducted 
by behavioral economists show that people are frequently motivated to 
impose sanctions based on reciprocity.  In other words, people want to do 
unto others as has been done to them.  Results from ultimatum games have 
shown that people are willing to pay a monetary cost to punish people who 
have treated them in ways that they perceive to be deserving of 
punishment.192  Reciprocity, in turn, seems to allow participants in repeated 
 
                                                                                                             
191Laurent Denant-Boemont et al., Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction 
Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment, 33 ECON. THEORY (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~cnoussa/index.html ("Because individuals who administer 
sanctions bear the cost of doing so, while all players benefit from the resulting increase in 
contributions, there is an incentive for individuals to free ride on others' provision of sanctions 
against low contributors."). 
192Werner Güth, et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 382 (1982).  See generally RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE 21-
35 (1992) (explaining the ultimatum game theory in its various forms, the simple ultimatum game, 
two-stage bargaining games, multi-stage games and their economic implications, and discussing that 
in an effort to punish the offeror, the offeree may reject an offer he perceives to be unfair because 
the offeror is overcompensated); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of 
Incentives, 46 EURO. ECON. REV. 687, 689-704 (2002) (explaining that nonpecuniary motives 
influence behavior); Werner Güth, On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments—A Personal Review, 27 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 329 (1995) (reviewing ultimatum bargaining experiments and discussing 
the difference between rational choice explanations and behavioral explanations in ultimatum 
games). 
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games to maximize their personal payoffs.193  While reciprocity in bilateral 
situations seems intuitive enough, what is interesting for our purposes is the 
evidence suggesting that reciprocity seems to be transferable—people view 
injustices perpetrated on others as if they had been perpetrated on 
themselves, and punish the offender.194  One example is the anti-Nazi 
boycotts during World War II.195  Thus, investors might be willing to 
sanction greedy CEOs and directors who approved their compensation 
packages regardless of the fact that they do not own shares in the 
corporations which lost money because of these agreements.  It suffices that 
other shareholders were treated badly by these CEOs and directors. 
 
C.  The Role of Norm Entrepreneurs and Change Agents 
The development and enforcement of social norms depends upon the 
actions of norms entrepreneurs and change agents.  In one scholar's view, 
"[c]hange agents are low-cost suppliers of new norms."196  They can do this 
because they are uniquely privileged by technical knowledge, and leadership 
skills allow them to bear the opportunity costs of norm reform.197  Professor 
Ellickson defines a "norm entrepreneur" as someone who "possess[es] a 
relatively high level of technical knowledge relevant to the norms within 
[their] specialty" and is "likely to be cognizant that there are appreciative 
experts . . . who are likely immediately to esteem the norm entrepreneur for 
trying to change the social practice at issue."198  There are several examples 
of norms entrepreneurs resorting to shaming techniques to enforce social 
norms.  For example, Bill Browder, the Chairman of the Hermitage Fund has 
been quoted as saying:  
Our basic approach is to thoroughly research and understand 
where the corporate malfeasance is taking place and then go to 
 
                                                                                                             
193ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (showing how a 
reciprocal strategy can lead to higher payoffs for a player in a repeated prisoners' dilemma).  
194Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. OF BUS. 
S285, S290-S292 (1986).  The results of the experiment were clear—74% of the players in the 
second round chose to sacrifice their monetary well-being in order to sanction individuals that 
treated other players unfairly. 
195William Orbach, Shattering the Shackles of Powerlessness: The Debate Surrounding the 
Anti-Nazi Boycott of 1933-41, 2 MOD. JUDAISM 149, 161-66 (1982). 
196Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in 
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2112 (2001) (giving the example of 
M&A Consulting, Inc.'s CEO, Yoshiaki Murakami's hostile bid for Shoei Corporation in Japanese 
corporate law). 
197Id. at 2112-13. 
198Ellickson, supra note 27, at 19. 
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great pains to simplify the story so the average person can 
understand what is going on. . . . . We then share the stories 
with the press.  By doing so, we want to inflict real 
consequences—business, reputational and financial.199 
Norm entrepreneurs like the Hermitage Fund also resort to the legal 
system to advance their cause.  They rely on the publicity generated by the 
filing of a lawsuit alleging a corporate governance violation to shame the 
company.200  Professor Bebchuk has emerged as a dominant norm 
entrepreneur in the CEO compensation area.  He possesses technical 
expertise, and has engaged in a sustained campaign aimed at increasing 
shareholder power, primarily by writing and speaking prolifically on the 
topic.201  Norms entrepreneurs have been remarkably active during the last 
few years in the CEO compensation area.  Their success is evidenced by the 
fact that the 2006 proxy season was witness to 23.9% of shareholder 
proposals being focused on executive compensation.202  Recently, the 
American Federation of State, Country, and Municipal Employees sponsored 
proposals at several corporations aimed at giving shareholders an advisory 
vote on executive compensation.  The proposals remarkably secured 37% 
and 47% favorable votes at Morgan Stanley and Bank of America, 
respectively.203 
There has been a slew of rulemaking by regulatory bodies in an 
 
                                                                                                             
199Dyck et al., supra note 11, at 3.  The authors also found that "the presence of the 
Hermitage fund among its shareholders increases the amount of coverage a corporate governance 
violation receives."   Id. at 4. 
200Id. at 9-10.  Bill Browder, Chairman of the Hermitage Fund, elaborated further: 
We've been involved in 32 lawsuits.  And we win in terms of public attention 
regardless of the outcome, where we've lost 31 times.  I think the proportion of 
number of words written in the press when a lawsuit is initiated to when it is 
dismissed is 50 to 1.  The court of public opinion is much more effective than the 
Russian legal system and much fairer.   
Id. at 16. 
201See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: 
A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807 
(2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits, 1 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 291 (2004); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive 
Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 282 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 71 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, Firm Expansion and CEO Pay (Nat'l 
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W11886, Dec. 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=875737. 
202Written Testimony, supra note 5, at 2. 
203Joseph Giannone, Shareholders Reject "Say on Pay," REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2007, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN1040609620070410?feedType=RSS. 
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attempt to appease these norm entrepreneurs.  The recent legislation passed 
by the House of Representatives was moved by House Financial Committee 
Chairman Barney Frank, a Democrat from Massachusetts, and is aimed at 
giving shareholders a right to cast an advisory vote on executive pay.  The 
success of norms entrepreneurs is owed to a signaling effect—politicians 
want to signal to their constituents that they are working to advance their 
welfare, and by adopting the agendas of norms entrepreneurs, they do 
precisely that.  It might also be dangerous for politicians with constituents 
who support the work of norms entrepreneurs to be seen as doing nothing.204 
They might expose themselves to secondary shaming—as people who are 
too cowardly to enforce the social norm, and hence undeserving of 
reelection.  Similarly, Abigail Barr explained that the results of her studies in 
rural Zimbabwe provide 
strong evidence that the shame-based sanctions anticipated and 
imposed by the communities that took part in my experiments 
were effective at promoting cooperation.  Villagers in 
Zimbabwe clearly care about what other people think of them 
and will modify their behaviour in order to improve their status 
in the eyes of their neighbours.205 
Norms entrepreneurs create conditions for the birth of a secondary 
sanction for the enforcement of the underlying norm.  When the risk of this 
sanction attaches to powerful groups like politicians who might otherwise 
free-ride, it advances the enforcement of the social norm enormously.  This 
seems to be at the root of the activity against excessive CEO compensation. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Social norms constrain CEOs and directors to act with regard for the 
interests of their shareholders.  Social sanctions present a low cost method to 
enforce these norms.  Legislative attempts ought to be restricted to 
facilitating the application of social sanctions by creating conditions, 
primarily in terms of mandating the disclosure of relevant information in a 
 
                                                                                                             
204Barr, supra note 18, at 3, 13.  "[S]anctions would be imposed upon non-cooperators by 
cooperators because by not cooperating the former are preventing the latter from getting their fair 
share.  If the imposition of sanctions reduces the payoff to the sanctionee more than the payoff to the 
sanctioner, cooperators can redress this imbalance by sanctioning non-cooperators."  Id. at 3.  See 
also Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,114 Q. 
J. OF ECON. 817 (1999) (discussing how fairness considerations motivate people because they want 
equitable outcomes and are willing to yield a payoff to create a fairer result). 
205Barr, supra note 18, at 13. 
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comprehensible format.  Shaming can decentralize the enforcement of the 
norm and facilitate investor protection without the need for regulatory 
expenditure.  There is considerable evidence that greed is viewed 
unfavorably in financial situations and the deployment of emotions like 
disgust can achieve constraints on excessive CEO pay.  This can be 
leveraged by agencies like the stock exchanges and institutional shareholders 
to influence the behavior of CEOs and corporate directors in positive ways. 
 
